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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Thomas Nelson Farmer appeals from the judgment of conviction entered 
upon his guilty plea to aggravated assault, and from the district court's order 
denying his I.C.R. 35 motion for reduction of sentence. 
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings 
In April 2014, officers were called to a Post Falls residence on the report of 
a physical domestic dispute. (PSI, pp.3-4.) There, officers observed Doris 
Williams standing across the street from the residence with physical injuries to 
her head, and with blood running down her face. (Id.) Officers then made 
contact with Williams' brother, Thomas Farmer, who was standing on the porch of 
the residence. (Id.) Farmer had blood on his hands and on his clothing. (Id.) 
Officers spoke with Williams' and Farmer's mother, who was also at the 
residence. (Id.) Farmer had been drinking for the last couple of days, and 
physically attacked Williams when Williams told him that he could no longer live 
at the residence if he continued to drink. (Id.) Thomas pulled Williams' hair, 
pushed her down onto a bike, and pressed his forearm across her throat while 
stating, "I'll kill you Bitch." (Id.) Farmer's mother pulled Farmer's hair and hit him 
with a frying pan to get him off of Williams. (Id.) Williams reported to officers that 
she could not breathe while Farmer was pressing his forearm against her neck, 
and that she thought she was going to die. (Id.) 
Officers arrested Farmer and noted the strong odor of an alcoholic 
beverage coming from Farmer's breath. (Id.) After receiving Miranda warnings, 
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Farmer acknowledged to the officer that he "grabbed" his sister, but stated that 
she "deserved it." (Id.) After the arrest, Williams told the officers that she did not 
want Farmer to return to the residence because she was afraid Farmer would kill 
her. (Id.) 
The state charged Farmer with aggravated assault and the persistent 
violator sentencing enhancement. (R., pp.37-38.) Pursuant to a plea agreement, 
Farmer entered an Alford 1 plea to aggravated assault, and the state agreed to 
dismiss the sentencing enhancement. (R., p.61; 3/25/14 Tr., p.6, L.14 - p.16, 
L.5.) The agreement did not bind the sentencing recommendations of either 
party. (R., p.61; 3/25/14 Tr., p.6, L.20 - p.7, L.12.) 
Prior to sentencing, but after the PSI, LSI-R assessment, and GAIN-I 
evaluation were completed, Farmer moved to withdraw his guilty plea on the 
ground that he was incorrectly informed of the terms of the plea agreement by his 
defense counsel. (5/12/14 Tr., p.35, L.19 - p.38, L.14; 5/16/14 Tr., p.42, L.2 -
p.44, L.10.) After a hearing, the district court denied the motion. (R., pp.77-78; 
see generally, 5/16/14 Tr.) The district court imposed a unified five-year 
sentence with two years fixed. (R., pp.74-76.) The court denied Farmer's 
subsequent I.C.R. 35 motion for reduction of sentence. (R., pp.89-92; 10/14/14 
district court order; 2 see generally 10/6/14 Tr.) Farmer timely appealed. (R., 
pp.79-82.) 
1 Alford v. North Carolina, 400 U.S. 25 (1970) 
2 The Idaho Supreme Court granted Farmer's motion to augment the record with 
the district court's order denying Farmer's I.C.R. 35 motion for reduction of 
sentence. (3/18/15 Order.) 
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ISSUES 
Farmer states the issues on appeal as: 
1. Did the district court err in denying Mr. Farmer's Motion to 
Withdraw Guilty Plea? 
2. Did the district court abuse its discretion when it imposed 
upon Mr. Farmer a sentence of five years, with two years 
fixed, following his plea of guilty to aggravated assault? 
3. Did the district court abuse its discretion when it denied Mr. 
Farmer's Rule 35 Motion for leniency? 
(Appellant's brief, p.5.) 
The state rephrases the issues on appeal as: 
1. Has Farmer failed to demonstrate that the district court abused its 
discretion by denying his motion to withdraw his guilty plea? 
2. Has Farmer failed to show that the district court abused its sentencing 
discretion? 
3. Has Farmer failed to show that the district court abused its discretion by 




Farmer Has Failed To Demonstrate That The District Court Abused Its Discretion 
By Denying His Motion To Withdraw His Guilty Plea 
A. Introduction 
Farmer contends that the district court abused its discretion by denying his 
motion to withdraw his guilty plea to aggravated assault. (Appellant's brief, pp.6-
12.) Farmer's contention fails because a review of the record reveals that 
Farmer failed to establish either that his plea was constitutionally invalid, or that 
there was any other just reason for the withdrawal of his plea. 
B. Standard Of Review 
"Appellate review of the denial of a motion to withdraw a plea is limited to 
whether the district court exercised sound judicial discretion as distinguished 
from arbitrary action." State v. Hanslovan, 147 Idaho 530, 535-536, 211 P.3d 
775, 780-781 (Ct. App. 2008) (citing State v. McFarland, 130 Idaho 358,362,941 
P.2d 330, 334 (Ct. App. 1997)). An appellate court will defer to the trial court's 
factual findings if they are supported by substantial competent evidence. State v. 
Holland, 135 Idaho 159, 161, 15 P.3d 1167, 1169 (2000); Gabourie v. State, 125 
Idaho 254, 256, 869 P.2d 571, 573 (Ct. App. 1994). 
C. The District Court Acted Well Within Its Discretion By Denying Farmer's 
I.C.R. 35 Motion For Reduction Of Sentence 
A motion to withdraw a guilty plea may be made before sentence is 
imposed. I.C.R. 33(c). The presentence withdrawal of a guilty plea is not an 
automatic right, however. State v. Carrasco, 117 Idaho 295, 298, 787 P.2d 281, 
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284 (1990); Hanslovan, 147 Idaho at 535, 211 P.3d at 780. The defendant bears 
the burden of proving, the district court, that the plea should be withdrawn. 
Hanslovan, 147 Idaho at 535, 211 P.3d at 780; Griffith v. State, 121 Idaho 371, 
37 4-375, 825 P.2d 94, 97-98 (Ct. App. 1992). 
In ruling on a motion to withdraw a guilty plea, the district court must 
determine, as a threshold matter, whether the plea was entered knowingly, 
intelligently and voluntarily. Hanslovan, 147 Idaho at 536, 211 P.3d at 781; State 
v. Rodriguez, 118 Idaho 957, 959, 801 P.2d 1308, 1310 (Ct. App. 1990). As a 
matter of constitutional due process, a plea is knowing and voluntary if it is 
"entered by one fully aware of the direct consequences, including the actual 
value of any commitments made to him by the court, prosecutor, or his own 
counsel." Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 755 (1970). 
If the plea was voluntary, in the constitutional sense, then the court must 
determine whether other just cause exists to allow the defendant to withdraw the 
plea. Hanslovan, 147 Idaho at 536, 211 P.3d at 781. The good faith, credibility, 
and weight of the defendant's assertions in support of his motion to withdraw his 
plea are matters for the trial court to decide. 1.9.:. at 537, 211 P.3d at 782. 
When the I.C.R. 35 motion is presented after the defendant has learned of 
the content of the PSI or has received other information about the probable 
sentence, the district court may temper its liberality by weighing the defendant's 
apparent motive. State v. Mayer, 139 Idaho 643, 647, 84 P.3d 579, 583 (Ct. App. 
2004). 
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In this case, Farmer asserted that his guilty plea was not knowing or 
voluntary because, he asserted, his defense counsel informed him that the state 
would recommend that the court place Farmer on probation. (5/12/14 Tr., p.35, 
L. 19 - p.38, L.14; 5/16/14 Tr., p.42, L.2 - p.44, L.10.) Farmer's counsel 
represented to the court that she "advised [Farmer] that the state was going to be 
recommending probation," but did not provide any details regarding the timing of 
this advisement in relation to the change of plea hearing. (5/16/14 Tr., p.42, 
Ls.13-21.) Farmer's counsel also submitted to the court an email exchange 
between her and the prosecutor in which defense counsel expressed some 
confusion about the terms of the plea agreement. (5/12/14 Tr., p.42, L.22 - p.43, 
L.11.) This email was not admitted into evidence and is not a part of the 
appellate record. (See id.) 
The district court cited the applicable legal standard, denied the motion, 
and concluded that "the issue of the state's recommendation was clear to 
[Farmer]." (R., pp.74-76; 5/16/14 Tr., p.47, L.14 - p.48, L.22.) The court 
generated a "rough transcript" of the change of plea hearing through its court 
reporter and noted that Farmer was specifically informed of the terms of the plea 
agreement, including that the state would be entitled to recommend any 
sentence up to the maximum sentence for aggravated assault. (5/16/14 Tr., 
p.41, Ls.12-18; p.48, L.16 - p.49, L.18.) The court also referenced a comment 
made by defense counsel in a prior argument for Farmer's release on his own 
recognizance that indicated that Farmer was aware that sentencing 
recommendations would be open. (5/16/14 Tr., p.49, L.19 - p.50, L.1.) 
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A review of the record supports the district court's determination. At the 
change of plea hearing, the court specifically informed Farmer that "[t]he parties 
for either side have open recommendations up to the statutory maximums or 
minimum recommendations as you may choose." (3/25/14 Tr., p.6, Ls.23-25.) 
Farmer indicated that he understood the agreement and that he had had enough 
time to discuss the agreement with his counsel. (3/25/14 Tr., p.7, Ls.17-24.) 
Later in the hearing, the court informed Farmer even more specifically that the 
state could "recommend anything it wants to up to five years in prison." (3/25/14 
Tr., p.8, L.25 - p.9, L.2.) Farmer indicated that he was aware of this term of the 
plea agreement. (3/25/14 Tr., p.9, Ls.3-4.) Farmer also indicated to the court 
that other than the plea agreement that was discussed in open court, nobody 
promised him anything in order to compel his guilty plea. (3/25/14 Tr., p.17, Ls.2-
5.) Further, the "sentence recommendation" entry on the state's pretrial 
settlement offer form signed by Farmer stated "Open Recs[.]" (R., p.61.) Neither 
the change of plea transcript nor the pretrial settlement offer form contain any 
confusing or contradictory information with regard to this term of the plea 
agreement. (See R., p.61; see generally 3/25/14 Tr.) 
Additionally, at the conclusion of the change of plea hearing, in the course 
of Farmer's counsel's argument for Farmer's release on his own recognizance, 
counsel stated that "it's important to note this plea agreement is open and my 
client understands that his performance on an O.R. release would be a very 
strong piece of evidence that your Honor would consider at the time of 
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sentencing." (3/25/14 Tr., p.21, L.23 - p.22, L.2.) This indicates that Farmer was 
aware that the state was not bound to recommend any particular sentence. 
Farmer moved to withdraw his guilty plea on the date of the scheduled 
sentencing hearing, after the PSI, LSI-R assessment, and GAIN-I evaluation had 
been completed and distributed to the court and to the parties. (5/12/14 Tr., p.23, 
L.10 - p.36, L.22.) The presentence investigator recommended that Farmer be 
sentenced to a prison term, and the LSI-R assessment concluded that Farmer 
was a "high risk" to re-offend. (PSI, p.32; LSI-R assessment, p.1.) Because 
Farmer was aware of this information prior to his motion to withdraw his guilty 
plea, the district court was entitled to "temper its liberality by weighing the 
defendant's apparent motive." Mayer, 139 Idaho at 647, 84 P.3d at 583. At the 
hearing on the motion to withdraw the guilty plea, the district court indicated that 
it was aware of its discretion to do so. (5/16/14 Tr., p.48, Ls.6-15.) 
Finally, there was a lack of specific evidence in the record regarding what 
exactly defense counsel told Farmer about the nature of the terms of the plea 
agreement. While defense counsel represented to the court that she "might well 
have told" Farmer that the state's sentencing recommendation would be for 
probation (5/12/14 Tr., p.36, Ls.5-7), and later that she "advised [Farmer] that the 
state was going to be recommending probation," (5/16/14 Tr., p.42, L.13-21), it is 
unclear whether she was expressing her own memory of events or was relying 
on allegations made to her by Farmer. Further, it is unclear from these 
statements whether Farmer alleged that defense counsel specifically told him 
that the state would be bound by the plea agreement to recommend probation, or 
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whether this was simply defense counsel's expectation regarding the state's 
recommendation that she expressed to Farmer. Finally, as the district court 
concluded, even "notwithstanding the fact that [Farmer's] counsel may have 
given [Farmer) some erroneous information before the plea, at the time of the 
plea [Farmer] knew that the state could recommend up to five years in prison 
without a probation recommendation." (5/16/14 Tr., p.50, Ls.2-8.) As discussed 
above, this conclusion is supported by the record. 
Farmer has failed to demonstrate that the district court abused its 
discretion in denying his motion to withdraw his guilty plea to aggravated assault. 
This Court must therefore affirm Farmer's conviction. 
11. 
Farmer Has Failed To Show That The District Court Abused Its Sentencing 
Discretion 
A. Introduction 
Farmer contends that the district court abused its discretion by imposing 
an excessive sentence. (Appellant's brief, pp.12-14). Farmer has failed to 
establish that the district court's five-year unified sentence with two years fixed is 
excessive considering the objectives of sentencing, the nature of the crime, and 
Farmer's extensive criminal record. 
B. Standard Of Review 
When a sentence is within statutory limits, the appellate court will review 
only for an abuse of discretion. State v. Farwell, 144 Idaho 732, 736, 170 P.3d 
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397, 401 (2007). The appellant has the burden of demonstrating that the 
sentencing court abused its discretion. kt 
C. The District Court Acted Well Within Its Sentencing Discretion 
To bear the burden of demonstrating an abuse of discretion, the appellant 
must establish that, under any reasonable view of the facts, the sentence is 
excessive. kt To establish that the sentence is excessive, Farmer must 
demonstrate that reasonable minds could not conclude the sentence was 
appropriate to accomplish the sentencing goals of protecting society, deterrence, 
rehabilitation, and retribution. kt 
In this case, prior to imposing its sentence, the district court reviewed the 
PSI, the LSI-R assessment, and the GAIN-I evaluation. (5/12/14 Tr., p.33, L.15 -
p.34, L.17.) The district court also specifically referenced the appropriate 
sentencing factors. (5/16/14 Tr., p. 70, L.17 - p. 71, L.1.) A review of the nature of 
Farmer's crime, his extensive criminal history, and a review of the relevant 
sentencing materials supports the district court's sentencing determination. 
The violent nature of Farmer's crime warrants the sentence imposed. 
Both Farmer's sister and mother reported to officers that they believed Farmer 
was going to kill his sister when he pressed his forearm against her neck. (PSI, 
pp.3-4.) Farmer's sister reported that she was not able to breath during this 
attack, and Farmer's mother reported that she had to strike Farmer with a frying 
pan in order to get Farmer off of his sister. (Id.) The attack resulted in blood 
being splattered on both Farmer and his sister. (Id.) Farmer was heavily 
intoxicated at the time. (Id.) The nature of Farmer's attack on his sister 
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demonstrates that Farmer presents a significant risk to his family or the 
community-at-large when he is under the influence. 
Farmer has an extensive criminal history. The PSI lists over 40 various 
criminal charges, and convictions for battery, assault, battery on a police officer 
or emergency personnel, taking a vehicle without the owner's consent, and 
possession of a controlled substance, among other charges. (PSI, pp.5-14.) The 
PSI also lists numerous probation and parole violations. (Id.) Farmer reported to 
the presentence investigator that he had spent a cumulative twelve years in 
prison. (PSI, p.14.) 
Finally, Farmer has demonstrated a lack of appreciation for the 
significance of his criminal conduct. Farmer told the presentence investigator 
that his sister was "trying to look like the victim." (PSI, p.5.) The presentence 
investigator observed that Farmer "appeared to minimize and justify his past 
criminal history and drug abuse." (PSI, p.22.) Based upon "the level of assessed 
risk and need and other protective factors," the presentence investigator 
recommended that the district court impose a sentence of prison incarceration. 
(PSI, p.23.) 
The district court's unified five-year sentence with two years fixed for 
aggravated assault was entirely reasonable in light of the objectives of 
sentencing, the nature of the crime, and Farmer's extensive criminal history. 




Farmer Has Failed To Show That The District Court Abused Its Discretion By 
Denying His I.C.R. 35 Motion 
A. Introduction 
Farmer asserts that the district court abused its discretion by denying his 
I.C.R. 35 motion for reduction of sentence. (Appellant's brief, pp.15-16.) 
However, a review of the record reveals that the district court's original sentence 
was not excessive, even in light of the additional information presented by 
Farmer in support of his I.C.R. 35 motion. 
B. Standard Of Review 
If a sentence is within applicable statutory limits, a motion for reduction of 
sentence under Rule 35 is a plea for leniency, and the Court reviews the denial of 
the motion for an abuse of discretion. State v. Huffman, 144 Idaho 201, 203, 159 
P.3d 838, 840 (2007). To prevail on appeal, Farmer must "show that the 
sentence is excessive in light of new or additional information subsequently 
provided to the district court in support of the Rule 35 motion." lit 
C. The District Court Acted Well Within Its Sentencing Discretion In Denying 
Farmer's I.C.R. 35 Motion 
Farmer filed an I.C.R. 35 motion for reduction of sentence approximately 
three months after his judgment of conviction was entered. (R., pp.89-92.) In 
support of the motion, Farmer submitted a letter in which he alleged: (1) his sister 
did not need medical attention after the aggravated assault; (2) he 
misunderstood the terms of the plea agreement; (3) he was currently on a waiting 
list to take an anger management course; (4) a defendant in a similar case had 
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received a lesser sentence; and (5) the Idaho state prison system has an 
"excellent pre-release program" that would help him find housing and 
employment when he was released. (Id.) At the subsequent hearing on the 
motion, Farmer clarified that he was requesting the court to reduce the fixed 
portion of his sentence so he could either be eligible for parole immediately, or so 
that he could have an earlier release date and thus be eligible for treatment 
immediately. (10/6/14 Tr., p.7, L.8- p.8, L.8.) 
The district court cited the applicable standard and denied Farmer's I.C.R. 
35 motion. (10/14/14 district court order; 10/6/14 Tr., p.12, L.6- p.13, L.11.) This 
determination is supported by a review of the record. First, much of the 
information presented by Farmer in support of his motion was already before the 
court at the time of sentencing (e.g., the fact that his sister did not need medical 
attention after the aggravated assault, his assertion that he misunderstood the 
terms of the plea agreement, the general nature of the Idaho Department of 
Correction "pre-release program.") The only "new" information provided by 
Farmer was that he was on a waiting list for treatment, and that he was currently 
attending church services. (See R., pp.89-92; see generally 10/6/14 Tr.) This 
information did not render the district court's original sentence excessive. 
Further, by the time Farmer filed his I.C.R. 35 motion, he had only 
approximately 17 months to serve on his two-year fixed sentence. (See R., 
pp.89-92; 5/16/14 Tr., p.72, Ls.19-20.) An appellate court reviews the whole 
sentence on appeal and presumes that the fixed portion of the sentence will be 
the defendant's probable term of confinement. State v. Oliver, 144 Idaho 722, 
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726, 170 P.3d 387, 391 (2007). The district court did not abuse its discretion by 
requiring Farmer to serve the remaining of his fixed term in the light of the 
circumstances of this case. 
The district court acted well within its sentencing discretion in denying 
Farmer's I.C.R. 35 motion. This Court must therefore affirm the district court's 
order. 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the judgment of 
conviction imposed upon Farmer's guilty plea to aggravated assault, and the 
district court's order denying Farmer's I.C.R. 35 motion for reduction of sentence. 
DATED this 6th day of October, 2015. 
MARK W. OLSON ' 
Deputy Attorney General 
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